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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL, III 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20040875-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to Operation of a 
Clandestine Laboratory, a first-degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37d-4 and 
58-37d-5. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence on April 4, 2003. 
The motion was denied. The Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea on October 
22, 2003 and was sentenced to a term of 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison on 
March 31, 2004. On June 8, 2004, Defendant's attorney filed a motion for re-
sentencing. The motion was granted and the Defendant was re-sentenced on 
September 15, 2004. The final order was signed on September 22, 2004. Defendant 
filed a notice of appeal on October 7, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I DID DEPUTY HANEY ARTICULATE SPECIFIC 
ARTICULABLE FACTS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY A 
LEVEL TWO DETENTION? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction of law 
standard of review. Determination of "whether a set of facts supports a reasonable 
articulable suspicion is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. 
Preece, 971 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Since this issue wasn't raised with the trial court it should be reviewed for 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. "[T]o establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant..." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court must determine as a matter of fact and law whether the 
Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
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defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id at 466 U.S. 
at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
II DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT DIDN'T HAVE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE CONTAINER IN 
HIS TRUNK? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's finding of facts should be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions 
of law should be reviewed for correctness. This is a search and seizure case, 
therefore this Court should grant the trial court's legal determinations a measure of 
discretion in applying the standard to the given facts. See, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 
1052, 1054 (Ct. App. 2003). This issue was preserved in the trial court when the 
Defendant's attorney filed a written motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 023-26). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Fourth Amendment - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Sixth Amendment -In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
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be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-37d-4 -Clandestine Drug Lab Act- Prohibited acts — Second degree 
felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it 
will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled 
Substance Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or manufacture a 
controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the intent to 
distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or conveying the controlled 
or counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless of whether the final 
destination for the distribution is within this state or any other location; or 
Section 58-37d-5- Clandestine Drug Lab Act - Prohibited acts — First degree 
felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), (f), or (h) is guilty 
of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous 
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance of 
a clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a substantial risk to human 
health or safety or a danger to the environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500 
feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
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(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a specified 
controlled substance; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine 
base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in Subsections 
(l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the violation, at 
sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 2) The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (j) cases 
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with possession of clandestine 
laboratory precursors or equipment, a first-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 58-
37d-4 and § 58-37d-5. (R. 013) The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence. (R. 023-26). A hearing was held on April 21, 2003. (R. 034). The trial 
court denied the Defendant's motion. (R. 035-38). On October 22, 2003, the 
Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge, preserving his rights to 
appeal. (R. 045). 
Due to some health problems, the Defendant wasn't sentenced until March 31, 
2004. The trial court sentenced him to a term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. (R. 074-75). The Defendant filed a motion to stay the imposition of 
sentence and a certificate of probable cause. (R. 079-84). The trial court denied the 
request on April 7, 2004. (R. 077). 
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Defendant's trial counsel, Deven Coggins, didn't file an appeal. On June 8, 
2004, he filed a document titled Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Request for 
Re-sentencing, Nunc Pro Tunc. (R. 085-087). A hearing was held on September 15, 
2004. The trial court granted the motion for post conviction relief and re-sentenced 
the Defendant to the original term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. The 
final order was signed on September 22, 2004. (R. 092-93). A notice of appeal was 
filed by Defendant's appellate counsel on October 7, 2004. (R. 095) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 11, 2002, Deputy Steve Haney of the Weber County Sheriffs 
Office initiated a traffic stop of the car the Defendant was driving. (R. 122/5-6). 
Deputy Haney testified that the Defendant did not stop at a stop sign. (R. 122/5-6). 
On direct examination Deputy Haney testified that the Defendant's car was coming 
off the freeway. He said "[i]t was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my eye on it 
because I thought I don't think he's going to stop, which, in fact, he didn't. He 
entered onto 12th Street, I had to avoid hitting him. He almost ran into me on 12th 
Street entering to go eastbound." (R. 122/5-6). On cross-examination, Defendant's 
attorney referred Deputy Haney to his police report. After Deputy Haney looked at 
his police report he said, "[i]t says here that he came to a stop after exiting 1-15 
southbound." Defendant's attorney then said, "[i]t also states that you - that the 
vehicle was at the stop sign, it seemed to be waiting for traffic to clear?" Deputy 
Haney's answer was "correct." (R. 122/14). 
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Defendant's attorney then said "[s]o he didn't roll through the stop sign?" 
Deputy Haney answered "[a]h, you know what? This was in my report, you know, I 
stop people rolling through there all the time, maybe this right here is different. I - -" 
(R. 122/14) 
Defendant's attorney said "[y]ou have no explanation of why you testified - -" 
Deputy Haney answered, "[y]ou know what? I thought that he rolled through 
it." (R. 122/14). 
On re-direct, the prosecutor said "[w]e've clarified in your report you stated 
the defendant actually did come to a stop at the stop sign?" 
Deputy Haney answered "[t]hat's what it says in my report." He was asked if 
that was accurate. His answer was "I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the 
stop so I would assume that's the correct way it happened." 
The prosecutor then stated, "[s]o you stopped the defendant for this failure to 
yield the right of way; is that correct?" (R. 122/18) Deputy Haney answered, 
"Correct." (R. 122/19). 
Deputy Haney who is a drug recognition expert testified that the Defendant 
seemed "very lethargic." The Defendant "spoke thick tongued, his eyes seemed 
droopy and he seemed disoriented." (R. 122/7). 
The Defendant produced his driver's license and registration. Deputy Haney 
didn't smell alcohol, but he was suspicious that the Defendant was under the 
influence of a narcotic. (R. 122/7). Deputy Haney had the Defendant step out of the 
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vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. (R. 122/7). The Defendant informed 
Deputy Haney that he had some back and leg problems. (R. 122/7-8). The 
Defendant told Deputy Haney that he had taken some Xanax earlier in the day. (R. 
122/8). Defendant testified that he had just had neck surgery and he needed to have 
three discs fused in his back. The Defendant told Deputy Haney that he had 
prescriptions for Xanax and Oxycontin. (R. 122/29). Deputy Haney had the 
Defendant perform the Romberg balance test. He estimated thirty seconds as fifteen 
seconds. (R. 122/8-9). The Defendant was asked to perform the finger-to-nose test. 
He missed the tip of his nose all six times. (R. 122/9). 
Deputy Haney then asked the Defendant if he could search his vehicle for 
narcotics. The Defendant gave him permission to do so. (R. 122/9). Deputy Haney 
didn't take the Defendant into custody and didn't at any time charge the Defendant 
with a DUI. (R. 122/17). Deputy Haney was asked what part of the vehicle he 
searched. His answer was "[b]y our policy when we search a vehicle it's bumper-to-
bumper, so I searched through the - you know, every bit of the front and the back 
seat and then I opened up the trunk." (R. 122/9) Deputy didn't ask for permission to 
search the trunk and the Defendant didn't open the trunk for him. Deputy Haney 
took the key out of the ignition and opened the trunk. (R. 122/17) 
Deputy Haney found a "big blue storage container" in the trunk. (R. 122/10). 
Deputy Haney asked the Defendant what was in the container. The Defendant 
answered "I don't know. It's my friends." (R. 122/10). Defendant testified that 
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when Deputy Haney found the blue container he asked "[w]hat do we have here?" 
Defendant answered, "I'm not sure. It's a friend of mine's and I can't give you 
permission to search it." (R. 122/30). 
There was nothing about the container that suggested there was drug 
paraphernalia inside it. (R. 122/18). Deputy Haney lifted the lid of the storage 
container and discovered meth lab equipment which the Defendant's conviction was 
based on. (R. 122/11). 
While Deputy Haney was searching the Defendant's car the Defendant stood 
with and spoke to Deputy Butler. (R. 122/24). They engaged in small talk. Deputy 
Butler didn't have any problems understanding him. He testified that "I couldn't 
smell alcohol or anything like that so I didn't believe he was intoxicated or anything 
like that. He was a little slow, you know, type thing, but he said he was tired so - -" 
(R. 122/25). 
The trial court took the matter under advisement. The court issued a written 
memorandum decision. (R. 035-38). The following findings are of significance to 
this appeal. 
6. Officer Haney asked the defendant if he could search the car for 
drugs. The defendant gave the officer permission to search. 
7. Officer Haney found a large blue plastic container in the trunk of 
the vehicle. 
8. The Defendant said he did not own the blue container 
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9. The defendant said that he could not give permission to search 
the blue container because he did not own it. 
10. Officer Haney opened the container and found the drugs and 
paraphernalia in the container. 
13. The court finds that the defendant did not revoke his consent to 
search the vehicle. 
14. The defendant said, "I do not own the container. The container 
belongs to a friend. I cannot give permission to search it." 
15. The defendant was not revoking his consent to search. 
16. The defendant was claiming that since he does not own the 
container, he cannot give permission to search it. The defendant 
was claiming the he does not have authority from the owner to 
grant the search. 
17. The Court finds that the defendant did not have standing to 
suppress the contents of the container because he claims he 
doesn't own the container. (R. 035-037). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion to suppress the search of a 
container that was found in the Defendant's trunk. During the suppression hearing it 
became apparent that the officer didn't recall the circumstances surrounding the 
traffic stop of the Defendant. Deputy Haney testified that Defendant didn't stop for 
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a stop sign and pulled out into traffic almost hitting him. Deputy Haney9 s police 
report was inconsistent with his sworn testimony. The prosecutor attempted to 
rehabilitate Deputy Haney's testimony. The prosecutor made a conclusory statement, 
"So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way; is that 
correct?" (R. 122/18). Deputy Haney answered, "Correct." 
The prosecutor didn't use Deputy Haney's report to refresh his memory or to 
clarify what the Defendant actually did that was a traffic violation. Therefore, this 
Court has no way of analyzing the circumstances surrounding the stop to determine 
if there were specific articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that Defendant had committed a traffic violation. 
Defendant's attorney's failure to recognize this deficiency and raise it with the 
trial court amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court should find that 
failure to alert the Court to the Constitutional issue was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and find that the traffic stop was not supported by a reasonable 
articulable suspicion. 
Defendant's trial counsel did file a motion to suppress challenging the search 
of a container in Defendant's trunk. During the course of the traffic stop Defendant 
consented to a search of his vehicle. Deputy Haney removed the keys from the 
ignition and opened the trunk. Inside the trunk was a large blue container. Deputy 
Haney asked Defendant what was in the container and Defendant informed him that 
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it was a friend's and he couldn't give permission to search it. Deputy Haney 
searched it anyway and found equipment for a methamphetamine lab. 
The trial court found that Defendant did not revoke his consent and since 
Defendant claimed that he did not own the container he did not have standing to 
challenge the search of it. These findings were incorrect. 
This Court should employ the two-step test articulated in State v. Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Has the defendant demonstrated a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the searched area? and is the expectation objectively 
reasonable? 
The container was in Defendant's trunk and Defendant was the driver and sole 
occupant of the vehicle. This Court held in State v. Bissegger 76 P.3d 178, 181 
(Utah Ct. App.2003) that driver's of vehicles have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle. 
The trial court erred when it found that Defendant did not revoke his consent 
and that he did not have standing to challenge the search. The Defendant 
specifically told the officers that he could not give permission to search the container 
and as owner and driver of the vehicle the Defendant has standing to challenge the 
search even though he claimed it was a friends. 
ARGUMENT 
L DEPUTY HANEY DIDN'T ARTICULATE SPECIFIC 
ARTICLUABLE FACTS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY A LEVEL 
TWO DETENTION 
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There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the general public. 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(citations 
omitted). 
In the case at bar, Deputy Haney initiated a level two detention when he stopped 
the Defendant's vehicle. An officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when the 
officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic 
offense . . ." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). The State has the 
burden of establishing those articulable facts. See, State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7, 12 
(Utah 2000). 
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, courts should 
"look to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective 
basis for suspecting criminal activity." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). When considering the totality of the circumstances the officer's 
conduct should be judged "in light of common sense and ordinary human experience 
. . . and we accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent 
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and suspicious actions." United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
Reasonable suspicion must also be judged against an objective standard. This 
Court must consider "whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the 
officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's 
personal security." State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Deputy Haney had the burden of establishing specific articulable facts to 
support the detention. "In determining whether this objective standard has been met, 
the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before 
the stop." State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d at 10. 
Deputy Haney testified at the suppression hearing about his reasons for 
stopping the Defendant. He was asked if he recalled the stop. He answered that he 
did. (R. 122/5). Deputy Haney was then very specific about what happened. He 
testified; "I was on 1200 South approaching the freeway, the freeway off-ramp from 
where people would get off coming southbound, I believe, on 1-15. I was 
approaching that when I saw a car coming off the freeway, it was a approaching the 
stop sign. It was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my eye on it because I 
thought I don't think he's going to stop, which, in fact, he didn't. He entered onto 
12th Street, I had to avoid hitting him. He almost ran into me on 12th Street entering 
to go eastbound." (R. 122/5-6). 
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Deputy Haney also testified that he "had to take evasive action. I had to hit 
my brakes, I had [sic] change lanes, I almost hit another car that was in the number 
two lane also traveling eastbound to avoid hitting the car." (R. 122/6). 
On their face, those facts would certainly amount to reasonable suspicion and 
even probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred. The problem in this case is 
that it is clear from cross-examination that Deputy Haney didn't remember what had 
happened and that the Defendant did stop at the stop sign. Defendant's attorney had 
Deputy Haney diagram the incident. After Deputy Haney finished, Defendant's 
attorney had him refer to his police report and asked him if he wanted to change his 
testimony about the stop. Deputy Haney looked at his police report and then 
answered, "Yes. It says here that he came to a stop after exiting 1-15 southbound." 
(R. 122/14). 
The following colloquy occurred between Defendant's attorney and Deputy 
Haney. 
Q And then it also states that you - - that the vehicle was at the stop sign, 
it seemed to be waiting for traffic to clear. 
A. Correct. 
Q. So he didn't roll through the stop sign? 
A. Ah, you know what? This was in my report, you know, I stop people 
rolling through there all the time, maybe this right here is different. I - -
Q. You have no explanation of why you testified - -
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A. You know what? I thought that he rolled through it. 
(R. 122/14). Defendant's attorney didn't ask any more questions about the stop. On 
re-direct examination the following colloquy took place between the prosecutor and 
Deputy Haney. 
Q. We've clarified in your report you stated the defendant actually did 
come to a stop at the stop sign? 
A. That's what it says in my report. 
Q. Is that accurate then? Is that - -
A. I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the stop so I would 
assume that's the correct way it happened. 
Q. So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way; 
is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
(R. 122/18-19). Defendant's attorney didn't ask any further questions about the stop. 
It is well settled that if a traffic violation is committed in an officer's presence 
the officer has not only reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to stop the vehicle. 
See, State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the State bears 
the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion. In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276, (Utah Ct. App.), this Court re-iterated that "the State bears the initial burden 
for establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary to 
support an investigative stop." 
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In the case at bar, Deputy Haney failed to meet this burden. He supposedly 
remembered the incident and testified that Defendant's vehicle was approaching a 
stop sign at a fairly high rate of speed, that it appeared the vehicle wasn't going to 
stop, that the vehicle didn't stop and that he [Deputy Haney] had to take evasive 
action to avoid the Defendant's vehicle. 
If these facts were accurate they would justify the stop and detention of the 
Defendant. However, it was clear on cross-examination that Deputy Haney didn't 
remember the incident and that his sworn testimony was inaccurate. He 
acknowledged that his police report stated that the Defendant did stop for the stop 
sign, but "I thought he rolled through it." (R. 122/14). When the prosecutor asked 
him if his report was accurate Deputy Haney stated, "I would assume so if I wrote it 
at the time of the stop so I would assume that's the correct way it happened." (R. 
122/18). 
The prosecutor didn't ask Deputy Haney what his report actually said. The 
prosecutor just made the conclusory statement formed as a question, "[s]o you 
stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way; is that correct?" 
Defendant replied, "[c]orrect." (R. 122/18-19). 
The problem here, is we know that Deputy Haney's original testimony 
concerning Defendant's alleged traffic violation was inaccurate and inconsistent with 
his police report. In an attempt to rehabilitate his witness, the prosecutor made the 
conclusory statement that he had "stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the 
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right of way; is that correct?" (R. 122/18). The prosecutor didn't have the deputy 
refer back to his police report to refresh his memory and didn't have him testify to 
the details of the report. Since we don't know what the Defendant really did, it is 
impossible to examine it to determine if what he did was a violation of the law and 
whether Deputy Haney had specific articulate facts that would justify a level two 
detention. It's the State's burden to establish these facts, and the State failed in this 
regard. 
Furthermore, although Defendant's attorney appropriately challenged the 
search of the container in the vehicle, he failed to raise this issue with the trial court 
so it should analyzed under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as well as 
plain error. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some 
guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
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reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. Although the Court 
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a 
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", Id. at 688, it did mention 
certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments 
in the course of the prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching 
requirement by the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was 
reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688. 
Other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels performance 
has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was presented 
with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did 
not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment. The 
Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to be deficient. The Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant 
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and 
that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual 
prejudice. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to 
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable 
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive 
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation 
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall 
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance 
in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 
(1986). 
In State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court reversed a 
conviction where a defense attorney failed to renew a motion to suppress during a 
trial. Based on the investigating officers trial testimony it became clear that the 
contraband he found was not in plain view. Id at 976. This Court found that the 
defense attorney was ineffective. "Having determined that defendant's trial counsel 
performed deficiently in failing to renew his suppression motion at trial, . . . we must 
now determine whether the admission of the tin evidence in this case was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 980. 
This Court found that since the conviction was based on the evidence found in 
the tin, admission was prejudicial. "[B]ecause that evidence was necessary to 
establish defendant's praraphernalia and drug possession charges, we conclude that 
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defense counsel's failure to renew his suppression motion after Deputy Zwemke's 
trial testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 981. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is whether "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. In Strickland, the Court held that 
"[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a 
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that to meet the second part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination 
that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider the totality of the 
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire 
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is 
supported by the record." Id. 
In the case at bar, both prongs of the Strickland test are met. The law is well 
settled that on this issue and thus, Defendant's attorney should have recognized and 
challenged the initial detention. "The right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures extends to a person's automobile." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 
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(Utah 1994). A law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle is being operated in violation of the law before he can make a traffic stop. 
See, State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197, 1200, (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The reasonable 
suspicion must be judged "against an objective standard - - that is, whether there 
were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which taken together with 
rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal security." Id. 
To determine whether this objective standard has been met, "the focus 
necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop." 
Id. The State has the burden of establishing these articulable facts. (Infra) 
In State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this Court suppressed 
the evidence when a trooper stopped a vehicle without reasonable suspicion. 
"Trooper needed reasonable suspicion that there was a safety equipment violation in 
order to conduct a valid stop. . . . " Id. at 1201. 
Defense counsel's failure to raise the lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. It meets both requirements of the 
Strickland test. Failing to recognize the lack of reasonable suspicion was deficient. 
Defense counsel should have recognized and raised this basic Fourth Amendment 
violation. Second, failure to raise the issue prejudiced the Defendant and there was 
an unreliable result. A ruling that the stop was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion would have resulted in the evidence being suppressed. "Absent reasonable 
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suspicion, evidence derived from the stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree."' State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). For these reasons, both requirements of the 
ineffective assistance test are met. 
In addition, it was plain error for the trial court to not recognize the Fourth 
Amendment violation. In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah 
Supreme Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised on appeal." A defendant must show the following to establish plain 
error, "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993). 
In this case all three elements of plain error have been met. (1) The error 
exists. Defense counsel's failure to alert the court to an obvious Fourth Amendment 
violation was error. (2) This error should have been obvious to the trial court. This 
area of law is well settled in Utah as the case cited above show. (3) Absent the error 
there is a likelihood of a more favorable outcome. If the trial court had recognized 
that the State didn't meet its burden concerning the reasonable suspicion for the stop, 
the appropriate remedy would have been suppression of the evidence. 
The State failed to present reliable evidence that the Defendant committed a 
traffic violation in Deputy Hadley's presence. It was clear that Deputy Hadley 
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didn't remember the specifics of his encounter with the Defendant and that his sworn 
testimony was in conflict with his police report. The prosecutor never did establish 
reliable evidence that the trial court could rely on to find that the stop was supported 
by specific and articulable facts. Defendant's counsel's failure to recognize and 
raise this issue was ineffective and it was plain error for the trial court to not 
recognize the Fourth Amendment violation. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT DIDN'T HAVE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE CONTAINER IN 
HIS TRUNK. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers can search without a 
warrant if they have consent. See, Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 
(1982). However, a person can limit the scope of his consent. See, State v. Castner, 
825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "The standard for measuring the scope of a 
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness 
- - what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
In the case at bar, the Defendant clearly limited the scope of his consent. 
During the encounter with the Defendant Deputy Haney asked for consent to search 
Defendant's vehicle for narcotics. (R. 122/9). Defendant gave him consent to 
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search. Deputy Haney conducted a "bumper to bumper" search. (R. 122/9) After 
Deputy Haney searched the interior of the vehicle he removed the keys from the 
ignition and opened the trunk. (R. 122/9-10). Inside the trunk was a blue container. 
(R. 122/10). Defendant informed Deputy Haney that the container was a friend's 
and he couldn't give permission to search it. (R. 122/30). After the Defendant gave 
this response, Deputy Haney lifted the lid and discovered what appeared to be a 
methamphetamine lab. (R. 122/11). 
When the Defendant's words are measured under an objective standard, the 
"typical reasonable person" would understand that the Defendant did not give 
Deputy Haney permission to search the container in his trunk. The trial court was 
very clear in its findings that the Defendant said "the container belongs to a friend. I 
cannot give permission to search it." (R. 036). 
The trial court ruled that since the Defendant claimed that he didn't own the 
container, he didn't have standing to challenge the search of it. (R. 036-37, #17). 
Since the Defendant specifically limited the scope of the consent, the analysis in this 
case is whether the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
container. See, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 
1005, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("[T]o challenge the propriety of a search, a 
defendant must first establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place.") 
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To determine whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
appellate courts "employ a two-step test." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 915 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). First, the court should examine whether the defendant has 
demonstrated "a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched area." State v. 
Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007. Second, the court must determine whether "the defendant's 
expectation was objectively reasonable . ." State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178, 181 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
In the case at bar, the Defendant was both the driver and the owner of the 
vehicle that was searched. (R. 122/27-33). Based on these facts, the Defendant had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle. In State v. Bisseger, this Court 
stated, "[w]e have held that a driver of a car who has either an ownership interest in 
the car or 'permissive, possessory control of the car' has standing to challenge a 
search of the car." Id. (quoting, State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
The trial court was incorrect when it ruled that Defendant did not have 
standing to challenge the search of the container. There was a somewhat similar 
factual pattern in the case of State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In 
Holmes, an officer stopped the defendant in her vehicle. The officer testified that the 
defendant looked back over her shoulder and removed a roll of paper towels from 
her purse and attempted to stuff it down between the car seat and the console. When 
the arresting officer asked the defendant for the roll of paper towels, she denied it 
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was hers. The officer reached into the car and removed the roll. Inside were two 
syringes that contained cocaine. Id. at 507. 
The State argued that the defendant didn't have standing to challenge the 
search since she claimed she didn't own the paper towels. In footnote five, this Court 
stated, "the trial court here necessarily determined that standing was not at issue. 
We note that a mere disclaimer of ownership in the context of a police query is 
insufficient in itself to make such an assertion." Id. at 512, fn. 5. 
This Court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress. Although, it wasn't addressed other than in the footnote, this Court 
obviously agreed with the trial court that the defendant did have standing to 
challenge the search. In the footnote this Court cited State v. Allen, 606 P.2d 1235 
(Wash. 1980). In Allen, the Washington Supreme Court held that a defendant had 
standing to challenge the search of a wallet on his person even though he denied 
ownership of it. "Since it was found on his person and the fruits of the search were 
proposed to be used against him, we have no question Allen has standing to 
challenge the search." Id. at 1236. 
In the case at bar, the container was in the Defendant's trunk. He therefore 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the container even though he denied 
ownership of the container. It was in his possession and the State charged him with 
knowingly possessing the items that were in the it. The State can't have it both 
ways. It would be inconsistent to deny him standing under these circumstances. 
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The trial court's legal conclusions that the Defendant lacked standing to 
challenge the search of the container were in error. The Defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the container and he specifically limited his consent 
concerning the container. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The State failed to provide specific articulate facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that Defendant committed a traffic offense. In addition, 
the Defendant did not consent to a search of the container in his trunk. The trial 
court's legal conclusion were incorrect when it ruled that that the Defendant did not 
have standing to challenge the search of the container. The Defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. For these reasons the trial court's 
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denial of Defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed. 
DATED this VJday
 0f April, 2005. 
V > -
, JOHN T>fcAIT4E ' * 
Attorney for Appellant 
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April, 2005. -. / . 
JOHNTCCAlNE l 
Attorney at Law 
28 
ADDENDUM A 
SECOND DISTRICT COO^t "'-'•''odJbEN" COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
 ir,_ 
• 'ir'CTCQimi 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021904753 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 




Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): COGGINS, DEVEN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 4, 1952 
Video 
Tape Count: 3:07 
CHARGES 
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY (amended) - 1st Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/22/2003 Guilty 
HEARING 
The Court proceeds with sentencing. Attorney Coggins indicates 
that if the defendant is sentenced to prison, he intends to file a 
motion to stay the sentence pending an appeal regarding the courtfs 
ruling on a motion to suppress. 
The Court proceeds with sentencing, and directs Mr. Coggins to 
file a certificate of probable cause if he believes that is 
appropriate. (Mr. Coggins may file the motion on or before April 
6, hearing is set April 7. Jail personnel 
have been requested not to transport the defendant to the prison 
pending that hearing). 
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Case No: 021904753 
Date: Mar 31, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
HEARING ON CERT PROB CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/07/2004 
Time: 02 : 00 p.m. 
Location: 4th Floor Southeast 
Second District Court 
2 52 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Dated this ") day of A ^ K 
fear 
r-H^y-
IIE W JONES 
District Court Ju 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea 
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801) 
395-1071. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL D ^ M C T b b U R T , STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DE^»3DI(IENT 






Case No. 021904753 
Ernie W. Jones 
District Judge 
Defendant's motion to suppress came on for hearing before the Honorable Ernie Jones on 
April H 2003. The State was represented by Attorney Brandon Maynard. The defendant was present 
and represented by Attorney Deven Coggins. The Court heard testimony from Officer Steve Haney, 
Officer Brent Butler and Casper Dunkel. The Court reviewed the memorandums of law and heard 
the arguments of counsel. The Court enters the following findings: 
1. The defendant was stopped by Deputy Haney for a traffic violation. 
2. The defendant appeared to be disoriented. He had droopy eyes, thick tongue, slurred 
speech and was slow and confused. 
3. Deputy Haney is a DRE (Drug Recognition Expert) and thought the defendant was under 
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the influence of drugs 
4. The defendant admitted he had used Xanax earlier in the day. 
5. The defendant failed several field sobriety tests conducted by Officer Haney. 
6. Officer Haney asked the defendant if he could search the car for drugs. The defendant 
gave the officer permission to search. 
7. Officer Haney found a large blue plastic storage container in the trunk of the vehicle. 
8. The defendant said he did not own the blue container. 
9. The defendant said he could not give permission to search the blue container because he 
did not own it. 
10. Officer Haney opened the container and found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside. 
11. The defendant claims there was no consent to search the container. 
12. The State argues that the defendant gave consent to search the vehicle, or in the 
alternative, the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search because the defendant claims no 
ownership of the container. 
13. The Court finds that the defendant did not revoke his consent to search the vehicle. 
14. The defendant said, "I do not own the container. The container belongs to a friend. I 
cannot give permission to search it." 
15. The defendant was not revoking his consent to search. 
16. The defendant was claiming that since he does not own the container, he cannot give 
permission to search it. The defendant was claiming he does not have authority from the owner to 
grant the search. 
17. The Court finds that the defendant does not have standing to suppress the contents of the 
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container because the defendant claims he doesniJt own the container. 
18. The Court will deny defendant's motion to suppress. 
19. The State will prepare an order consistent with this decision. 




DISTRICT COURT JUDfGE 
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State vs. Dunkel, 
Case #021904753 
Certificate of Mailing: 
I hereby certify that on the A > ^ of April, 2003, 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing order to 
counsel, as follows: 
Brandon Maynard 
^£\ Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230 
Ogden, UT 84401 
r.fl
 m Deven Coggins 
Attorney for De 
289 24th Street, 
Ogden, UT 84401 




Ljfead Deputy C(h)rt Clerk 
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ADDENDUM C 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 021904753 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: September 15, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN 
Prosecutor: PARMLEY, RICHARD A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): COGGINS, DEVEN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 4, 1952 
Video 
Tape Count: 2:55 
CHARGES 
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY (amended) - 1st Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/22/2003 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for hearing on defendant's motion for 
resentencing, to preserve appeal rights. The Court finds that the 
motion is appropriate. The defendant is resentenced nunc pro tunc, 
and previous sentence stands but the 
sentence is effective as of today, in order to preserve 
defendant's appeals rights. The defendant requests that Mr. 
Coggins withdraw, Mr. Coggins is ordered withdrawn as counsel. The 
Court notifies the defendant that he has 30 days 
oy2 
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Case No: 021904753 
Date: Sep 15, 2004 
from today's date to file his appeal. 
Dated this 7-P~ day of , C-J^^-^t 20 . ° *• / 
TIRNIE W JONES 
District Court Judge 
oy3 
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I call him. 
THE COURT: How about for the defense, are you going 
to call any witnesses? 
MR. COGGINS: Just my client, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's have the witnesses 
sworn in then at this time. Mr. Coggins, let's have your 
client sworn if he's going to testify. 
THE CLERK: Raise your right hand. 
(Whereupon the witnesses were sworn.) 
THE COURT: All right. Did you want to take up 
anything preliminarily before we start? Anything we need to 
discuss? 
MR. COGGINS: No. I believe the motion's pretty 
much state our — or the memorandums pretty much state our 
position. 
THE COURT: And I have had a chance to read both 
your memorandums. Go ahead and call your first witness then. 
MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, the state calls Deputy 
Haney. 
STEVE HANEY, 
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAXNARD: 
Q. Go ahead and introduce yourself to the Court. 
A. Deputy Steve Haney, Weber County sheriff!s office. 
THE COURT: Just for the record, how do you spell 
your last name? 
THE WITNESS: H-A-N-E-Y. 
Q. (BY MR. MAYNARD) How long have you been with the 
sheriff's office? 
A. Six years. 
Q. Did you work on October 11th of the last year as a deputy 
county sheriff? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Let's talk about a stop that you investigated with the 
Casper Dunkel. Do you recall that stop? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And what was that — about what time was that? 
A. Let's see, the stop was made at — the stop was made at 
2033. 
Q. Describe how that took place. 
A. I was eastbound on 1200 South approaching the freeway, 
the freeway off-ramp from where people would get off coming 
southbound, I believe, on 1-15. I was approaching that when 
I saw a car coming off the freeway, it was a approaching the 
stop sign. It was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my 
eye on it because I thought I don't think he's going to stop, 
which, in fact, he didn't. He entered onto 12th Street, I 
had to avoid hitting him. He almost ran into me on 12th 
1 Street entering to go eastbound. 
2 Q- Describe when you — when you say had to do something to 
3 avoid hitting him, what did you do — 
4 A. I had to take — I had to take evasive action. I had to 
5 hit my brakes, I had change lanes, I almost hit another car 
6 that was in the number two lane also traveling eastbound to 
7 avoid hitting the car. 
8 Q- Describe what you did then when you — once you made the 
9 traffic stop. 
10 A. I initiated my overhead lights. I pulled over the car 
11 and approached the driver of the vehicle. 
12 Q- H o w many people were in the vehicle? 
13 A. Only one. 
14 Q. And do you recognize the driver of the vehicle in the 
15 courtroom today? 
16 A. Yes, I do. 
17 Q. Would you point him out to the Court? 
18 A- He's right here at the defendant's table with the 
19 off-white shirt here. 
20 MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, I'd ask that the record 
21 reflect he indicated the defendant. 
22 THE COURT: Any objection to the identification? 
23 MR. COGGINS: No, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect that 
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Casper Dunkel, III, was — he 
— he spoke very thick tongued 
seemed disoriented. 
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point after speaking with him and observing his 
characteristics or his face? 
A. Being a drug recognition expert, I — and not smelling 
alcohol, I had suspicion that he might be under the influence 
of a narcotic. 
Q. Did you ask him'about that, about his narcotics use? 
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some backache, leg problems. 
MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, may I approach the 
witness? I have a — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MAYNARD: — something I would like to show him. 
Q. (BY MR. MAYNARD) I asked you a question earlier about 
his medication. I'm going to have you read this paragraph of 
your report and then — 
A. You know, I just saw this on my report. 
Q. Okay. 
A. When he said no, I didn't read on. He actually admitted 
that he took some Xanax earlier in the day before we started 
the field sobriety tests. 
Q. So you had that information prior to starting — 
A. Yes. 
Q. -- field 
Describe 
sobriety? All right. 
what took place then once you had the 
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seconds in his head 
1 while, you know, eyes closed, head tilted back. Mr. Dunkel 
2 estimated 30 seconds as 15 seconds. He swayed two inches 
3 from front and back and one inch side to side. The other 
4 test I did was a finger-to-nose test. Mr. Dunkel missed the 
5 tip of his nose all six times. 
6 Q. Once you had performed these field sobriety tests, did 
7 you do any other field sobriety tests? 
8 A. No, I did not do any more. 
9 Q- Well, what happened after you performed -- completed the 
10 field sobriety tests? 
11 A. I asked him if there was -- if he was on any other 
12 medications or drugs which he said no. At that point, I 
13 asked him if I could — if I could search his car for any 
14 other narcotics which he said I could. 
15 Q. What did you do once he had given you permission to 
16 search the vehicle? 
17 A. By that time Deputy Butler had arrived on the scene and I 
18 had him watch Mr. Dunkel by the front of my car, I began to 
19 search his vehicle. 
20 Q. What portion of the vehicle did you search? 
21 A. By our policy when we search a vehicle it's 
22 bumper-to-bumper, so I searched through the — you know, 
23 every bit of the front and the back seat and then I opened up 
24 the trunk. 
25 Q. What did — did you find anything while you were 
1 searching the trunk? 
2 A. I found a big blue storage container, big blue plastic 
3 I storage container that was sitting in the trunk with some — 
4 that was just sitting there. 
5 Q- About how big would you describe it? 
6 A. It was one of the large containers that you can by at 
7 any, you know, Wal-Mart, Target. You know, about yea long 
8 with the handles on it, you know, about I!d say about that 
9 deep (indicating). 
10 Q. Okay. So you're saying about what, 2 feet deep maybe 
11 about 3 feet wide? 
12 A- Itfs — it's about that, yeah. 
13 Q. Okay. By what, about a foot and a half 2 feet wide? 
14 A. I imagine. 
15 Q. Around that size? 
16 A. Yeah, it was one of the larger ones. 
17 Q- What did you do once you saw that? 
18 A. I asked Mr. Dunkel if it was his. 
19 Q. And what was his response? 
20 A. Actually — I think actually what I did ask him — I 
21 asked him what was in it, is what I asked him. I asked, 
22 "What's in this?" 
23 Q- And how did he respond? 
24 A. He said — I believe I have it quoted as saying, "I don't 
25 know. It's my friend's." 
11 
Q. Do you have that quoted from your report? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What happened after he gave this response? 
A. I lifted up the lid on top of the plastic container and 
saw there was glassware and other items that appeared to be 
meth lab. 
MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, I believe at this point I 
have no further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Any cross? 
MR. COGGINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
C30SS-EXAMINATICN 
BY MR. OOQGINS: 
Q. Deputy Haney, my name is Devin Coggins and I represent 
Mr. Dunkel. 
First question I have is: Is your car equipped with a 
video unit? 
A. It is now. 
Q. It wasn't at the time? 
A. At the time my car was being outfitted with one. The 
actual recording device was in New Jersey getting fixed, it 
was under repair, so no, it was not active at the time. 
Q. I!m sorry I missed the name, but the other deputy that 
came later, what was his name? 
A. Deputy Brent Butler. 
Q. Did he come in a separate squad car as well? 
1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. Do you know if his car was equipped with a video? 
3 A. It is equipped with a video, I don't know if it was on or 
4 not. 
5 Q- Okay. Thank you. 
6 Now, let's talk about when you first observed the 
7 vehicle. Now, I'm going from recollection here on when you 
8 come off of the freeway at that 1200, when you come off 
9 southbound on 1-15, you come to a stop sign and then there's 
10 a light, correct? 
11 A. There is no traffic — there is no traffic signal there. 
12 It's just a stop sign controlling that intersection. 
13 Q. Is there some sort of median, some sort of a turn median 
14 there to direct the traffic that's heading eastbound? 
15 A. There is a median there, yes. 
16 Q. Okay. And how far does that -- if I may, is there 
17 something — 
18 THE COURT: Yeah, you can flip that around. 
19 MR. COGGINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: There should be a blackboard there. 
21 Q. (BY MR. COGGINS) Officer, here is my understanding of — 
22 here is going to be 1-15, okay. We've got north, okay. And 
23 it's my recollection that there's kind of a U-turn or a 
24 wraparound you take to get onto 1200 off the 12th Street 
25 exit; is that correct? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. So — 
A. That's for northbound exiting onto 12th Street. We're 
talking southbound which exit is on the other side of the 
freeway. 
Q. Oh, okay. 
A. So I can get up and draw it if you'd like. 
Q. That would probably work better. 
A. This is 12th Street right here. And, yes, there is for 
northbound — if you're going northbound, yes, it does loop 
around and come back. But if you're heading southbound it 
exits right here, comes by — the Pilot Situation is right 
here. You come off, there is just a stop sign that is all 
that is regulating coming onto 12th Street off the freeway 
here. 
He approached here, he slowed down. I was headed this 
way. There is a median right here that you can go into, he 
did not go into it. He rolled through the stop sign. As I 
came up here, he came out into here as I was coming up right 
here. I had to brake right here, I had to move over into 
this lane. There was actually a car here that also slammed 
on its brakes, I avoided that car and he came into the number 
one lane right here. 
Q. Okay. And you pulled him over somewhere — 
A. Right here. 
1 4 
Q. Okay. Okay. Thank you, that clears that up for me. 
Okay. Now, Deputy, it's — you testified that he did not 
stop at the stop sign; is that correct? 
A. He rolled through it. 
Q. Okay. And you do have your report in front of you; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at the beginning of your report in the narrative 
section would you — do you want to change your answer at all 
on whether or not he stopped after reviewing that? 
A. Yes. It says here that he came to a stop after exiting 
1-15 southbound. 
Q. And then it also states that you — that the vehicle was 
at the stop sign, it seemed to be waiting for traffic to 
clear? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So he didn't roll through the stop sign? 
A. Ah, you know what? This was in my report, you know, I 
stop people rolling through there all the time, maybe this 
right here is different. I --
Q. You have no explanation of why you testified --
A. You know what? I thought that he rolled through it. 
Q. Okay. Now, once you approached the vehicle, you 
indicated that his speech was — how did you describe it, 
thick tongued? 
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A. It was thick tongued. 
Q. Okay. And was there anything else other than his speech 
that you noticed? 
A. Other than his speech? 
Q. Yes. 
A. His eyes were droopy, seemed very disoriented. Like I 
said, when he was getting his license and registration he 
seemed very confused. 
Q. Did he seem nervous? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, in your experience when you pull people over 
are they sometimes nervous or shaky when they're trying to 
get their license and registration out? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And are they that way even when you do not suspect them 
of any narcotics or any alcohol or anything like that? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Okay. You indicated that there are people that are 
nervous, have difficulty getting their licenses out. 
A. There are people that are nervous, but as far as 
difficulty getting their information out, not unless they're 
usually impaired. 
Q. So you've never had anyone that was not impaired take 
their — have trouble getting their license out of their 
wallet? 
io 
A. No. Usually it's a pretty easy transition. 
Q. Okay. You also indicated that you did not smell any 
alcohol. 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Okay. When you asked him about drug use he mentioned he 
had had a Xanax earlier, are you familiar with Xanax? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Did you ask him how much earlier he had had that? 
A. He said he took earlier, that's all I have down in my 
notes. 
Q. Okay. So based upon — based upon this, you conducted 
some field sobriety tests? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you give him any — any balance test as far as 
the walk and turn, one-leg stand, anything like that? 
A. The reason why I did not perform the walk and turn and 
balance test was because he did tell me that he had ailments 
such as back, neck, and leg problems, I did not want it to be 







Especially out on the roadside with cars driving by. 
Did you conduct an HGN? 
I don't have it down here. 
What about a vertical gaze? 
Again, I don't have it down here. 
17 
Q. Okay. Was there anything preventing you from performing 
the vertical gaze nystagmus or the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So after this you determined that — well, after you gave 
him the test, you asked him to get out — or you then asked 
him if you could search the car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't take him into custody at that point? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, when you asked him to search the car, did you 
tell him that you would be searching the trunk? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Did he open the trunk for you or did you open it? 
A. I opened it. 
Q. How did you open it? 
A. With a key. 
Q. Okay. Where did you get the key? 
A. The key was in the ignition. 
Q. So you took the key out of ignition to open the trunk? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, when you noticed this container, was it taped shut? 
A. If I remember, it did have some tape around it but it 
wasn't taped shut. 
Q. Okay. But you don't have anything about tape in your 
1 report? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. And when you asked him about the container, isnft it true 
4 that he told you that he couldn't tell you — he couldn't 
5 give you consent to search that container? 
6 A. All he said was, "I don't know. It!s my friend's." 
7 Q. Okay. Is there anything about that container that 
8 announced to you that inside of it there was any 
9 paraphernalia? 
10 A. Just by looking at it, no. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 MR. COGGINS: Thank you. That's all I have. 
13 THE COURT: Any other questions? 
14 MR. MAYNARD: One follow-up area, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. MOXNARD: 
18 Q. We've clarified in your report you stated the defendant 
19 actually did come to a stop at the stop sign? 
20 A. That's what it says in my report. 
21 Q. Is that accurate then? Is that --
22 A. I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the stop 
23 so I would assume that's the correct way it happened. 
24 Q. So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield 
25 the right of way; is that correct? 
19 
A. Correct. 
MR. MAYNARD: No further questions. I just wanted 
to clear that up, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. COGGINS: No follow-up, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer, you may step down. 
Thank you. Call your next witness. 
MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, the state calls Deputy 
Brent Butler. 
BRENT BUTLER, 
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXZ4433SEATICN 
BY MR. M&XNRRD: 
Q. Please introduce yourself, first and last name and then 
also spell your last name for the record. 
A. Brent Butler, B-U-T-L-E-R, deputy with the Weber County 
sheriff's office. 
Q. How long have you been with the sheriff1s office? 
A. I think about eight and a half, nine years. 
Q. We're talking today about October 11th of last year, 
around 8:30 you were called as a backup to Deputy Haney; is 
that correct? 
A. Actually, I was — I was working a traffic shift. I just 


























stopped to assist. 
Q. At what point did you arrive? 
A. Looking at my times on my report from dispatch it was 
8:40. He had been on the stop for probably seven, 10 
minutes. 
Q. What did you observe when you got there? 
A. When I arrived Deputy Haney was talking with the driver. 
I got out of my vehicle and walked around to the side of his 
car — actually, the passenger side of Deputy Haney's car. I 
noticed there — I witnessed Deputy Haney ask Mr. Dunkel to 
get out of vehicle and he walked him back between the two 
cars. 
Q. Were you able to -- did you stay back by Deputy Haney's 
car then? 
A. I did. 
Q. What took place then once --
A. Deputy Haney asked him to perform a couple field sobriety 
tests. 






Are you a drug recognition expert? 
I'm not so I just watched basically. 
Where did these tests take place? 









You were still by the passenger side? 
I was actually around the front of Deputy Haneyfs car — 
At that point? 
— yeah. I walked around just to observe what was going, 
After the field sobriety tests, what happened? 
Deputy Haney asked Mr. Dunkel if he could search his 
vehicle. 
Q. And was he allowed to search his vehicle? 
A. He was. 
Q. What took place then once the search — who did the 
search? 
A. Mr. Dunkel — or Deputy Haney. 
Q. And what did you do? 
A. I just stood back with Mr. Dunkel. We just stood back at 
the -- between the vehicles basically. 
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BY MR. OOGGINS: 
Q. Deputy Butler, my name is Devin Coggins, by the way, I 
represent Mr. Dunkel. 
From the time you arrived until Mr. Dunkel was taken into 
custody, do you know how long that was, if you had to 
estimate? 
A. Well, he performed a couple field sobriety tests and then 
Deputy Haney searched the vehicle. I would say that was 
probably maybe 10, 15 minutes if that. 
Q. Okay. So it only took him 10 to 15 minutes to search the 
vehicle and to give the field sobriety tests? 
A. Well, he performed two field sobriety tests and then — 
Q. Do you recall — sorry to interrupt. 
Do you recall which tests he performed? 
A. They were more of a DRE-type tests than your alcohol. 
They weren't the standard heel-to-toe or anything like that. 
Q. Okay. That's okay. 
A. They're ones I haven't been trained in so, obviously, I 
wouldn't know what to look for. 
Q. That's fine. Go ahead. Sorry to interrupt. You were — 
I was just asking how long it took from the time he was given 
the test until he completed the search of the car and 
arrested Mr. Dunkel. 
A. I think 10, 15 minutes. I was there — looking at my 
23 
times I was there maybe not even an hour. I stood by until 
the WISK unit the agent from — 
Q. The Strike Force? 
A. — the Strike Force showed up. 
Q. Now, you said that you heard Deputy Haney ask Mr. Dunkel 
what was in the container. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Do you recall what Mr. Dunkel!s response to that question 
was? 
A. He said it was his friend's. 
Q. Okay. You don't recall him saying anything else 
regarding searching that container? 
A. No. He never told him — you know, I don't know -- don't 
look, he never said anything like that. He just said, "It's 
my friend's." 
Q. Is your — at the time, was your unit equipped a video 
device your car? 
A. My truck, yeah. 
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1 A. Actually, when I arrived Deputy Haney was up talking with 
2 Mr. Dunkel, I assumed he was finishing the traffic stop 
3 because he had been on it so I — there was no reason for me 
4 to record anything because I thought he was finishing. So I 
5 just walked around to see — you know, stand by, I thought he 
6 was actually done. 
7 Q. Once he began to do field sobriety tests and those things 
8 did you — did it cross your mind to put your truck in a 
9 position where you could have videoed the encounter? 
10 A. Well, I was out of my vehicle. I — normally I don't 
11 record other people's traffic stops. I record my traffic 
12 stops. 
13 Q- If Deputy Haney would have asked you to, you would have 
14 though, correct? 
15 A. Sure. 
16 MR. COGGINS: One moment. If I could just have a 
17 second. 
18 Q. (BY MR. COGGINS) Deputy, did you have an opportunity to 
19 speak with Mr. Dunkel while Deputy Haney was performing the 
20 search of the vehicle? 
21 A. Yeah. We were just standing back there at the bumper of 
22 Deputy Haneyfs car. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. It was just small talk, the weather and that type of 
25 stuff. 
1 Q- D i d y°u have any problems understanding him? 
2 A. I could -- he wasn't — you know, I couldn't smell 
3 alcohol or anything like that so I didn't believe he was 
4 intoxicated or anything like that. He was a little slow, you 
5 know, type thing, but he said he was tired so — 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A- — I took it at that. 
8 Q- Either way, you didn't put anything in your report that 
9 you had any suspicions about any impairment on Mr. Dunkel; is 
10 that correct? 
11 A. No, I didn't. 
12 MR. COGGINS: All right. Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Recross? 
14 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. MRYNRRD: 
16 Q. You're not a drug recognition expert? 
17 A- I'm not• 
18 MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, I have no further 
19 questions. 
20 THE COURT: Officer Butler, what was said between 
21 two parties about the question of searching the vehicle? 
22 What do you remember Officer Haney saying? 
23 THE WITNESS: I believe he asked him if he could 
24 look in the vehicle and Mr. Dunkel told him yes. 
25 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
Zb 
THE WITNESS: 
yeah, you can look. 
THE COURT: 






And Mr. Dunkel told him — or said, 
Any discussion about what he was looking 
to search the vehicle? 
: I don't recall that. 
Okay. So that's it? Anything else? 
: No. That's — 
Just can I search the vehicle and he 
THE WITNESS: That's what I recall. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. MAYNARD: I have nothing. 
THE COURT: Any other questions, Mr. Coggins? 
MR. COGGINS: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer Butler, you may step 
down. Thank you. 
Any other witnesses from the state? 
MR. MAYNARD: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The state rests? 
MR. MAYNARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any witnesses from the defense? 
MR. COGGINS: Yes, your Honor. I'd like to call 
Mr. Dunkel. 
27 
CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL, III, 
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EKMMINATICN 
BY MR. COGGINS: 
Q. Mr. Dunkel, could you please state your name for the 
record. 
Are you under 
A. Yes. Casper Michael Dunkel, III. 
Q. Now, Mr. Dunkel, first question I have: 
the influence of any medication today? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you taken any illegal narcotics within the last 48 
hours? 
A. No. 
Q. Any prescription medication? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What have you taken? 
A. Oxycontin and Xanax. 
Q. When was that, yesterday? 
A. Well, I did have Xanax earlier this morning because I'm 
having a real hard time sleeping and, you know, nervous over 
going to court and stuff. 
Q. And that's prescribed to you from a doctor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Dunkel, you recall the incident that 
1 we've been talking about here in court today, correct? 
2 A. Yes, I do, very well. 
3 Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to skip forward a little bit 
4 just — when Deputy Haney approached your vehicle, did he ask 
5 you to get out of the vehicle? 
6 A. No, he did not. 
7 Q. Well, I mean, at some point did he ask you to get out of 
8 vehicle? 
9 A. Yes, he did, at one point. 
10 Q- Okay. Now, did he conduct any tests on you at that 
11 point? 
12 A. Yes, he did. 
13 Q. What do you recall that he did? 
14 A. Well, I explained my condition that I just had a neck 
15 surgery and that I'm getting -- I have to have three discs 
16 fused in my back, all right, and plus I've had two broken 
17 femurs and I'm not too well towards that. I remember the 
18 30-second test, giving it to me and how I did it. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you remember any other tests? 
20 A. Yes. I did do a standing toe-to-toe test. 
21 Q. Heel-to-toe? 
22 A. Yes, I did. 
23 Q. You walked a line? 
24 A. Yes, I did. 
25 Q. Okay. Now, after you finished the tests, were you placed 
zv 
under arrest? 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. Were you told that you were going to be placed under 
arrest? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. And at that point, what happened? Is that when he asked 
you to search the car? 
A. He asked me if he could search inside my car for other 
narcotics other than what I had already told him that I have. 
Q. You mean the Xanax you had taken earlier? 
A. I had in my possession at the time Xanax and I wasn't 
sure if I had any Oxycontins with me, but I told him those 
were the two prescriptions that I am on. 
Q. Okay. Now, do you recall how long he searched the 
interior of your vehicle? 
A. To me it seemed liked it had to have been at least an 
hour. It was long, long, long drawn out like he was looking 
for like DNA or something, I mean, he was all through 
completely that car everywhere. 
Q. Okay. Now, do you recall if he searched the trunk? 
























Yes, I do. 
What was your — what did he ask you about the conta 
He asked, "What do we have here?" And I said, "I'm 
sure. It's a friend 




BY MR. MAXNARD: 














edibility to — 
THE COURT: 
of mine's and I can't give you 
it." 





Dunkel, if you're convicted of this 
Objection, your Honor, relevance. 
It goes to his motivation or his 
I'll allow it. I guess it goes to 
far as his testimony. 
THE WITNESS 
(BY MR. MAYNARD) 
is offense? 
I'm not sure. 
Do you know what 
Yes, I do. 
What is that? 
: Pardon? 
What happens if you get convicted 
degree of offense this is? 




Q. And do you know what the possibility penalties are for a 
first degree felony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are those? 
A. Five to life. 
Q. In fact, if you're convicted of this offense, isn't it 
true that you will go back to prison? 
MR. COGGINS: Objection, your Honor, that's beyond 
the scope of his ability to answer and I think we've already 
established — 
THE COURT: I think if he knows he can answer. 
Maybe he doesn't know. 
THE WITNESS: I haven't the slightest — no 
slightest idea if I will or I won't. 
Q. (BY MR. MAYNARD) Do you have a guess or do you have a 
feeling one way or the other? 
MR. COGGINS: Objection, speculative. Asking him 
for speculation. 
THE COURT: I think he's already answered it, hasn't 
he? He said he didn't know, so sustained. 
Q. (BY MR. MAYNARD) How long did it seem like the 
defendant -- or that the deputy had you stopped and talked to 
you before you got out of the car? 
A. Well, he came up and I apologized because I didn't see it 
and I explained what happened and towards the signal that was 
32 
there, all right, it was turning — it went from green to 
orange, all right, and there's a signal there and I took it 
for granted that there's a signal on 12th Street there that I 
am not familiar with. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Dunkel, my question is: How long — once you 
had been stopped and the deputy came up to talk to you, how 
long was it from that point until you actually got out of the 
car? 
A. Say approximately 20 minutes. 
Q. And then you said that it seemed like an hour once the 
deputy was inside your car searching? 
A. Yes, when he asked if he could search inside my car. 
Q. How long — how long did it take once you got out of car 
for the deputy to do those field sobriety tests before he 








I'd say approximately 15 minutes. 
The car that you were in was your car? 
Yes, it was. 
And you're the registered owner? 
Yes. 
And there was no one else in the car? 
No. 
MR. MAYNARD: I'm drawing a blank. I had a question 












MAYNARD) You were 
>y had looked in the 
is that correct? 
Haney did ask you i: 
narcotics in the car? 
A. 
placed under arrest 
trunk and looked in 
£ he could look for 
He asked if he could search the inside < 













remember him asking 
the inside of 




of my car and I 
my car • 
stration? 
remember having a conversation with an 
Force after you were arrested? 
do. 
agent from 
MR. MAYNARD: Your Honor, I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. COGGINS: I don't have any follow-up, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dunkel, you may step 
down, 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any more testimony? 
MR. COGGINS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
